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This review assesses recent economic
trends with particular emphasis on
changes to official development assis-
tance strategies and the regional free-
trade agenda. These issues are exam-
ined from different perspectives
including those of donors, the Pacific
Islands Forum, and nongovernment
organizations (n g os) in the field. In
particular, a milestone was reached 
at the Forum with the signing of the
Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agree-
ment. In relation to aid, Australia 
has developed a unique strategy for
exporting its refugee problem by
inducing island states to host deten-
tion centers. The merits of the now
infamous “Pacific Solution” are
assessed. Finally, developments in
West Papua are examined, as this has
significant ramifications for human
rights and regional security.
It is well nigh impossible to obtain
reliable economic statistics from the
Pacific Island countries for the imme-
diately preceding year. Discussions of
economic performance and trends
must therefore rely on data up to two
years old. Moreover, it is not particu-
larly instructive to merely examine
economic indicators from one year 
in isolation. For these reasons, the
following analysis draws on statistics
collected in the late 1990s to ascertain
broad patterns and their significance.
In recent years several of the
region’s major donors—including
Australia, the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (a d b)—have undertaken
reviews of economic development and
aid. The peak nongovernment aid
b o d y, the Australian Council for Over-
seas Aid (ac f oa), has also engaged in
an assessment of overseas develop-
ment assistance and the role of non-
g o v e rnment organizations in pro v i d i n g
support including aid to the Pacific. 
It is timely to analyze the state of the
debate concerning Pacific Islands
development and aid. 
An assessment by the Asian Devel-
opment Bank concluded that eco-
nomic performance in its twelve
member Pacific Island countries was
disappointing in the 1990s, notably
when measured in terms of growth in
gross domestic product. The average
growth rate in the 1990s was around
3.5 percent. However, the late 1990s
were volatile due to the combined
effects of the Asian economic crisis
and natural disasters, resulting in a
negative regional growth rate of 3.2
percent in 1997. Papua New Guinea
recorded almost zero growth in the
five years ending in 1999. Conversely,
1999 was identified as the year of
recovery for the Pacific overall. Papua
N e w Guinea and Fiji b e g a n to i m p ro v e
after an extended downturn. With the
exception of Papua New Guinea,
inflation declined in the Pacific Island
countries in the late 1990s mainly due
to deflationary pressures in the world
economy. The overall balance of pay-
ments position of most Pacific Island
countries improved. The Asian Devel-
opment Bank attributed the improved
outlook largely to the fact that several
Pacific Island countries engaged in
economic reforms, which began to
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reap benefits by the end of the decade
(a d b 2000, 1–2). 
Notwithstanding the region’s
chronic dependence on imports and
aid, the economic outlook was gener-
ally positive in the late 1990s. This
was shattered by political instability
and violence in Fiji and the Solomon
Islands in mid-2000, with devastating
economic effects that rippled through
the region as a whole (see von Stro-
kirch 2001). Both countries experi-
e n c e d n e g a t i v e g ro w t h , u n e m p l o y m e n t ,
loss of business confidence, strains on
government finances, and severe bal -
ance of payments difficulties. In the
Solomon Islands the key export-earn-
ing industries of palm oil, gold, fish
canning, and tourism shut down alto-
gether as a consequence of the crisis.
Statistics on growth and financial
management do not accurately port r a y
quality of life. There is agreement
among analysts, including the Asian
Development Bank, AusAID, and the
Australian Council for Overseas Aid,
that poverty is on the increase in the
Pacific Islands. The Pacific Island
countries still enjoy relatively high per
capita incomes, high per capita aid,
and productive subsistence sectors by
global developing country standards.
However, high costs, weak economic
performance, aging infrastructure,
rapid population growth, urban drift,
widening inequality, and the erosion
of traditional support networks have
all combined to exacerbate poverty.
Of course the Pacific Island coun-
tries experience poverty to differing
degrees. The populous Melanesian
states of Solomon Islands, Vanuatu,
and Papua New Guinea are worst off
and rate very poorly in measurements
of both human development and
poverty according to United Nations
indexes. The Federated States of
Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands rank
in the middle level of developing
nations, whereas the Cook Islands,
Fiji, S ä m o a, Tonga, and Tuvalu exhibit
the least poverty. Measures of poverty
include life span, child weight, liter-
acy, and access to clean water and
health services (u n d p 1999).
Clearly the need for foreign aid to
promote sustainable development in
the Pacific Islands and thereby com-
bat poverty has not diminished. How-
ever, the amount of aid provided has
remained fairly static, while some
external donors have reduced their
commitments to the region. The
United States and the United King-
dom significantly reduced their aid 
for budgetary reasons and because of
changing priorities in the wake of the
Cold War. Australia maintains that it
has cushioned the Pacific Island coun-
tries from reductions to the global aid
budget, but in real terms Australian
aid to the region is also slowly declin-
ing. However, other countries, includ-
ing China, Taiwan, and France, have
increased their presence and overseas
development assistance to the region,
with a view to winning friends and
influence among the small island
states.
The US General Accounting Office
recently published a useful overview
of trends in overseas development
assistance to the Pacific Islands over
the last decade. From 1987 to 1999
seven top donor countries and organi-
zations provided about $11 billion, or
93 percent, of all development assis-
tance to the Pacific Island countries.
In descending order of contribution,
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the five bilateral donors are Australia
($3.8 billion), the United States ($3.1
billion), Japan ($1.6 billion), New
Zealand ($685 million), and the
United Kingdom ($394 million), while
the two multilateral donors are the
European Union ($900 million) and
the Asian Development Bank ($506
million). French “aid” to its territories
and the wider Pacific is excluded from
this and most other overseas develop-
ment assistance reports.
Major donors tend to target their
assistance to a select few recipients.
For example, 75 percent of Australia’s
overseas development assistance to the
region over a decade went to Papua
New Guinea because of historical
associations and concerns over
regional security, but also due to
Papua New Guinea’s size and human-
itarian need. Similarly, 91 percent of
US assistance went to its former UN
Trust Territories with which it now
has Compacts of Free Association: the
Federated States of Micronesia, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and
Palau. The European Union and the
Asian Development Bank allocated
more than half their aid, respectively,
to two recipients: EU aid went to
Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
Islands, and adb assistance went to
Papua New Guinea and Sämoa. Many
of the other Pacific Island countries
are also reliant on a single donor for
most of their overseas development
assistance (u s g ao 2001, 8, 26).
An important trend in the 1990s
was the shift in approaches to deliver-
ing aid. In the past, a major form of
overseas development assistance had
been through budgetary assistance,
particularly between metropolitan
powers and their associated island
territories. Low levels of control over
aid funds were maintained partly
because of guilt over colonial exploita-
tion, but also because during the Cold
War a primary concern of western
donors was to maintain friendly rela-
tions with microstates. In the 1990s
these donor policies changed to
demand greater accountability. Aid
has since been targeted toward techni-
cal assistance, infrastructure projects,
training programs, and sector-wide
programs in areas such as health or
education. Donors have also helped to
set up trust funds as a way of provid-
ing self-sustaining revenue and reduc-
ing long-term aid dependence for
small atoll states (u s g ao 2001, 17).
Objectives and associated jargon
on the part of major aid donors have
steadily converged. In the early 1990s,
regional aid donors followed the lead
of the World Bank in focusing on pri-
vate sector development, downsizing
the public sector, and fostering “good
governance,” especially of public
finances. Of the bilateral donors, the
Australian government has been most
committed to pushing this agenda. For
example, in 1995 AusAID launched a
Policy Management and Reform
Fund to allocate grants competitively
between island countries based on
t h e i r p re p a re d n e s s t o e n g a g e in re f o rm .
In Papua New Guinea the World
Bank has been the leading multilateral
agency responsible for imposing struc-
tural adjustment programs, while in
the Republic of the Marshall Islands,
Federated States of Micronesia,
Sämoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, and Vanu-
atu, the Asian Development Bank has
directed such reforms (Maclellan,
2001).
An associated trend is that the
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major donors have become progres-
sively more committed to coord i n a t i n g
their overseas development assistance
to the region. From 1995 to 2000 the
Asian Development Bank convened
eleven group consultative meetings
between aid donors concerned with
particular Pacific Island countries. 
In 2001 the top aid donors and the
United Nations held a meeting to
discuss regional assistance strategies,
while a joint meeting was held to con-
fer on the Solomon Islands crisis. In
the same year, Australia and New
Zealand moved to formally coord i n a t e
their regional aid policy and advised
regional economic ministers accord-
ingly. Ostensibly this approach is
designed to render aid delivery more
e ffective and predictable for re c i p i e n t s .
Coordination by powerful donors
could also be perceived as a means of
imposing an often unwanted agenda
on the microstates.
Many among civil society, nongov-
ernment organizations, and academics
have been critical of the current donor
obsession with good governance,
which is construed variously as a
means of explaining away flaws in
donor policies, legitimating a reduc-
tion in aid, disciplining states, or
mollifying aid skeptics or victims 
of restructuring within donor states
(Macpherson and Macpherson 2000).
Another problem is that the donor
fixation on institutional strengthening
within the Pacific Island countries has
led to neglect of other development
needs, such as maintaining essential
infrastructure and services, rural
outreach, and social welfare more
broadly. For some time it blinded
donors to the socioeconomic and thus
the political and security consequences
of restructuring and related austerity
measures. A dramatic example was
the popular response in 2001 to such
policies being imposed on Papua New
Guinea.
In March, PN G troops rebelled
against the government’s adoption of
a Commonwealth review group’s pro-
posal for significant cuts to the size
and operations of the defense force.
During the ten-day crisis that ensued,
soldiers drew connections between
their plight and the structural adjust-
ment program supported by the Wo r l d
Bank, the Asian Development Bank,
and Australian advisors. In this way,
their protest linked up with those of
students, trade unionists, and others
dissatisfied with the nature, pace, and
impact of economic reforms. The gov-
ernment backed down on the military
reform and granted amnesty to the
rebels. However, it proceeded with
privatization of key national assets
and utilities to meet World Bank and
International Monetary Fund condi-
tions, thus prompting further mass
protest, which resulted in several peo-
ple being shot by police in late June
(PNB, April, June, and July 2001).
After nearly a decade of concerted
campaigning for “good governance”
and structural adjustment reforms, it
seems that regional aid donors have
been rethinking their policy and prac-
tice, and are beginning to acknowl-
edge the need for modification. While
they have not abandoned their com-
mitment to reforming “inefficient”
governments, they are recognizing
other development needs as well as
the imperative to persuade civil soci-
ety of the merits of particular policies.
The a d b Pacific Strategy for the
New Millennium is indicative of
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emerging donor attitudes. It under-
took a review and concluded that cer-
tain priorities and methods for deliv-
ering aid were being neglected. The
salutary lessons included the need for
stronger islander ownership of policy
reform and for development projects
to take local culture and capacities
into account. The Asian Development
Bank continued to support economic
management, governance, public sec-
tor reform, and private sector devel-
opment. Yet in addition it now advo-
cated a more active role for women in
all spheres, sustainable environmental
management, poverty reduction as a
unifying theme, and an inclusive role
for civil society (a d b 2 0 0 0). The same
themes were evident in the Cotonou
agreement defining the priorities and
approaches for delivering European
Union aid to its African, Caribbean,
and Pacific (ac p) partners (Cotonou
2000).
Nongovernment organizations
working in this field are pleased at 
the progressive new tone of these key
multilateral aid donors, albeit rather
puzzled that the above approaches
have been announced as though they
w e re re v e l a t i o n s . I n f a c t a g e n c i es in t h e
n g o community and also the United
Nations have been long-standing
advocates of poverty reduction, inclu-
sion of women, sustainability, and
consultation with civil society as guid-
ing principles in the provision of aid.
However, nongovernment organiza-
tions are skeptical as to whether the
newfound rhetoric of regional aid
donors will be matched by a genuine
follow-through in practice.
A notable and potentially radical
element of the new donor rhetoric is
the emphasis on being more inclusive
of civil society in designing and imple-
menting development strategies. This
change stems from a belated recogni-
tion that failure to consult with the
range of affected stakeholders can
result in a policy being poorly re c e i v e d
and ineffective, or in a worst-case
scenario, violently opposed. While the
Pacific has witnessed national mass
protests against harsh economic
re f o rms, burgeoning anti-g l o b a l i z a t i o n
campaigns have alarmed governments
and capitalists the world over. Non-
government organizations have also
become more effective as lobby gro u p s
in the regional and global arenas, in
part due to the revolution in commu-
nications such as the Internet.
UN agencies were among the first
to acknowledge the importance of
consulting re p resentatives of civil soci-
e t y, usually in the form of established
nongovernment organizations, in dis-
cussions of any significant social, eco-
nomic, or environmental initiative.
The involvement of key nongovern-
ment organizations has become a
feature at UN conferences. The Euro-
pean Union also appears committed
to consulting widely with regional
nongovernment organizations before
deciding how to allocate development
funds. The World Bank, Asian Devel-
opment Bank, and the Common-
wealth Secretariat have developed
policy on n g o consultation. The
Pacific Islands Forum (p if) Secretariat
is tentatively following suit and
recently set up an n g o Policy Con-
sultation Framework in an effort to
facilitate dialogue with civil society.
The Forum Secretariat intends its
n g o consultation framework to
enhance understanding of economic,
social, and political issues through
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formalized linkages with nongovern-
ment organizations, thereby impro v i n g
regional development and coordina-
tion. The focus is on a two-way flow
of general information between the
Pacific Islands Forum and nongovern-
ment organizations, and coordination
on specific issues. The Secretariat has
limited formal consultation with par-
ticular types of nongovernment orga-
nizations, which must be legally con-
stituted and representing elected
national bodies, focused on the Pacific
region, working in key areas of Secre-
tariat activities, and actively engaged
with p i f island governments or devel-
opment partners. The Pacific Islands
Association of Non-Governmental
Organizations and the Pacific Confer-
ence of Churches are the only two
regional nongovernment org a n i z a t i o n s
to be named as permanent members
of the p i f advisory group. Other rep-
resentatives will be chosen from non-
government organizations specializing
in gender, environment, community
development, and the business sector
(p i f 2000).
Another policy on which most
regional aid donors are agreed is the
need for the Pacific Island countries
to engage in trade liberalization as a
means of reducing inefficiency in
export sectors and facilitating integra-
tion into the global economy. This
perspective is integrally related to the
donor push for improved economic
management by governments and
s t ru c t u r al re f o rm s of island e c o n o m i e s .
Australia, in particular, has linked up
with multilateral agencies to promote
the regional free-trade agenda. In
recent years the European Union and
Australia have dismantled preferential
trade agreements with the Pacific
Islands in order to establish new
arrangements consistent with World
Trade Organization (w to) require-
ments and Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (a p e c) guidelines. a p e c
is an open free-trade area, rather than
an exclusive trade bloc like the Euro-
pean Union.
The Cotonou Agreement is a
twenty-year aid and trade package
signed by the European Union and its
ac p partners in Benin in June 2000.
The culmination of years of negotia-
tion, it replaced the Lomé convention,
which had extended nonreciprocal
trade preferences to ac p members
since 1975. However, these trade pref-
erences discriminated against other
developing countries and thus contra-
vened wto regulations. The Cotonou
Agreement requires negotiations for
wto-compatible trade arrangements
to begin by September 2002. These
must be concluded and in force by
2008 at the latest. During the transi-
tional period, existing arrangements
will continue although states will be
encouraged to begin liberalization
efforts. Originally the ac p group
included eight Pacific island states;
they have been joined by six new
members. Collectively they will re c e i v e
29 million Euro in aid for regional
development over the period 2001–
2005 (Cotonou 2000; Maclellan
2001).
The European Union’s aim for the
ac p economies is to promote their
smooth and gradual integration into
the world economy; enhance produc-
tion, supply, and trading capacities;
create new trade dynamics and foster
investment; and ensure full conform i t y
with wto p rovisions (Cotonou 2 0 0 0) .
To facilitate implementation of a
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Pacific free-trade area, the European
Union has provided technical assis-
tance in the form of three experts
based at the Forum Secretariat to
advise on trade policy, trade develop-
ment, and fiscal reform. The trade
p rovisions and aid from Cotonou have
lent further impetus for the Pacific to
c reate its own regional free-trade are a .
The issue of regional trade and
economic integration had first been
raised at the inaugural Pacific Islands
Forum in 1972. It was not until 1997
that the p i f economic ministers put
the concept back on the agenda. By
1999, leaders had endorsed the notion
of a free-trade area in principle and
directed officials to begin drafting 
an agreement. The texts of a Pacific
Agreement on Closer Economic Rela-
tions (pac e r) and a Pacific Island
Countries Trade Agreement (p i c ta)
w e re finalized at the Forum trade min-
isters meeting in June 2001 in Sämoa.
These texts were then opened for sig-
nature at the Forum heads of govern-
ment meeting held in Nauru in August
2001. Leaders hoped that prompt rat-
ification by the minimum of six states
would allow the agreements to enter
into force by the time of the next
Forum (p i f 2001).
The Pacific Agreement on Closer
Economic Relations is an economic
cooperation agreement setting out the
region’s vision on future trade and
economic relations. It provides for
cooperation, financial and technical
assistance in areas such as trade pro-
motion, capacity building and struc-
tural adjustment. The Pacific Island
Countries Trade Agreement specifies
that the fourteen Forum island coun-
tries will reduce trade tariffs to zero
on goods traded among themselves
while maintaining their barriers
against imports from elsewhere. The
majority of tariffs within the region
would be phased out by 2010 for
larger economies and 2012 for small
island states and least-developed coun-
tries. A longer period will be allowed
for a select few imports to protect
weak industries. Governments are
urged to adopt alternative taxes to
compensate for the loss of tariff rev-
enue. The trade agreement covers all
trade in goods but not services. One
of the long-term aims of the Forum 
is to create a fully integrated regional
market covering all economic transac-
tions. p i c ta membership of Australia
and New Zealand proved contentious.
A compromise allowed the island
states to proceed with their free-trade
area while allowing the metropolitan
powers to be privileged pac e r trade
partners (P N B, Aug 2001, 4–5; Sept
2001, 12–13).
Secretary General of the p i f Secre-
tariat Noel Levi issued an impassioned
plea for support of the p i c ta concept
at a working party meeting back in
February 2001. He said that Forum
island countries “must face the reality
that they can no longer isolate them-
selves nor are they immune to global-
isation and its effects.” Moreover,
“regional integration provides a train -
ing ground where we can prepare
our economies to be more efficient
through increased economies of scale,
before they are subjected to the rigors
of full global competition” (P N B,
March 2001, 12). Levi continued his
crusade for p i c ta acceptance at the
2001 Forum. He claimed that it “rep-
resented the region’s best chance of
maintaining its current market access
into the European Union, as well as
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future market opportunities.” He
warned that job losses would be the
price for not adopting a free-trade
area (P N B, Aug 2001, 4).
Some Pacific Island leaders have
been skeptical about the merits of
integrating with the global capitalist
economy and expressed their concerns
at January’s conference of Pacific
leaders. However, the full weight of
the European Union, Australia, New
Zealand, the Asian Development
Bank—all major aid donors—and the
Forum Secretariat was thrown behind
the Pacific free-trade agenda, not to
mention the authority of Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation and the World
Trade Organization. p i f governments
had little option but to conform. Noel
Levi emphasized that the idea was the
Forum’s own creation dating back to
its inception. Critics believe that the
attempt to market the concept as the
“culmination of a regional dream is
aimed at legitimating the proposal . . .
to create a strong sense of ownership
among Pacific governments” (P N B,
Sept 2 0 0 1, 1 2 –13). T he F o rum expects
any adverse social impacts from the
Pacific Island Countries Trade Agree-
ment to be small, but has not pro-
vided evidence to support this asser-
tion. Nongovernment organizations
such as the new Pacific Network on
Globalisation are concerned that yet
again a significant policy has been
pushed through without adequate
public debate.
Global insecurity combined with
the domestic politics of a significant
regional aid donor to bring pre s s u re to
bear on island leaders in early Septem-
ber when Australia sought volunteers
for its “Pacific Solution” to off-load
asylum seekers. The saga began on 26
August when a Norwegian cargo 
ship picked up more than 400 mainly
Afghan refugees from a sinking ferry.
The Tampa sought permission to
unload its human cargo at Christmas
Island but was refused the right of
entry. The Tampa then defied Austra-
lian demands to return the refugees to
Indonesia and instead entered Austra-
lian waters, prompting Special Air
Service troops to board the ship. The
eight-day drama ended with the
asylum seekers being transferred to 
a troop carrier for transportation to
Papua New Guinea and thereafter
being sent by air to Nauru and New
Zealand for processing of their claims.
Australia’s conservative coalition
government headed by John Howard
ostensibly adopted the “Pacific Solu-
tion” as a means of stemming the
influx of what they termed “illegal
immigrants” and “queue jumpers.”
However, the rhetoric suggested that
it was a thinly disguised attempt to
capitalize on the xenophobia of many
Australians, create a scapegoat for
social ills, and thus divert attention
from the government’s policy record
in the lead-up to a federal election in
November. The September 11th
attacks on the United States ensured
that the Australian public was even
less inclined to accommodate refugees
f ro m A f g h a n i s t an a nd t h e M i d d l e E a s t ,
whom the government was quick to
consider potential terrorists. As public
opinion overwhelmingly supported
the policy, the government became
determined to pursue the Pacific
Solution, no matter what the cost.
Nauru and New Zealand were
the first to acquiesce to Australian
requests to take the asylum seekers.
Australia offered to pay all the costs
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of housing and processing the boat
people in Nauru and offered the tiny
island republic an additional u s$10
million in aid in return for their
cooperation. In the first instance, the
financially stricken country had its
power supplies paid up for several
months, scholarships doubled, and a
u s$500,000 bill to Australian hospi-
tals written off. By December, long-
term aid projects had been designed
in the areas of health, education, and
waste management (m o u 2001). With
hindsight Nauru could have asked for
more, given that Australia was alleged
to have spent  u s$10 million a day
for military operations during the
height of the Tampa crisis.
With a total land area of 21 square
kilometers for its 11,500 long-term
residents, Nauru was not well placed
to receive an unending flow of asylum
seekers. Australia thus began to sound
out other Pacific Island states to host
refugee processing centers. By Octo-
ber Kiribati, Fiji, Palau, Tuvalu, and
Papua New Guinea had held discus-
sions with Australian officials. Fiji
was offered  u s$4 million to cover
the costs of setting up a center and
u s$4 million in aid (P I R, 11 Nov 01).
Opposition to the proposal grew
quickly from across the political
spectrum in Fiji. Former Prime Min-
ister and Labour leader Mahendra
Chaudhry said Australia’s offer was a
shameful display of checkbook diplo-
macy (P I R, 27 Oct 01). President
Ratu Josefa Iloilo believed that major
p roblems in Fiji, such as the land lease
issue, needed resolution. Allowing
refugees into the country would only
create more problems. Similarly, the
Great Council of Chiefs was opposed
because Fiji needed to focus on deal-
ing with the effects of the 2000 coup.
The government duly turned down
the Australian proposal.
Despite strong domestic opposition,
Papua New Guinea did agree to host
over 200 mainly Iraqi asylum seekers
on Manus Island in return for at least
u s$500,000 in aid (P I R, 17 Oct 01).
It withheld the option of taking more
at a later date. In view of the knock-
backs from the other four candidates,
Australia asked Nauru to take more
refugees. By year’s end Nauru had
received several shipments totaling
over 1,100 refugees and another aid
bonus of  u s$5 million (P I R, 11 Dec
01). Papua New Guinea was also
gearing up to receive more. Both
Nauru and Papua New Guinea had
a g reed to take the boat people on con-
d i t i o n that their claims be processed
promptly and that they depart by the
end of May. This commitment may
not be easy to honor in practice.
Ireland and New Zealand have agreed
to accept small numbers of approved
refugees while other developed nations
see it as Australia’s responsibility.
A tough anti-immigrant stance
combined with public insecurity over
terrorism played a major role in the
conservative coalition’s winning a
third term in office in Australia. By
any other measure the Pacific Solution
can hardly be heralded as a success.
In financial terms, cabinet documents
indicate that the government has spent
u s$148 million on sending asylum
seekers to the Pacific while it is bud-
geting  u s$100 million per annum for
the policy to continue. These amounts
are double the original estimates and
certainly far in excess of the cost of
processing refugees in Australia itself
(P I R, 25 Jan 02). There is also no
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evidence that the Pacific Solution 
has deterred asylum seekers, who are
determined to flee persecution at great
personal risk despite the dual policies
of mandatory detention and process-
ing claims in Pacific islands. The issue
has proved extremely divisive for the
multicultural Australian community.
The Australian Senate is holding a full
i n q u i ry into the govern m e n t ’s handling
of asylum seekers in 2002.
There is also concern over what 
the Pacific Solution has cost Australia
in terms of its reputation as a “good
international citizen.” The inter-
national community has been united
in disapproval of the Pacific Solution
as it is felt Australia should process
incoming refugees on its own terr i t o ry.
The UN High Commission on Refu-
gees has indicated that Australia
should accommodate most of the
successful refugee applicants, whereas
Australia has steadfastly refused to
shoulder the burden alone. Australia
has faced a constant stream of criti-
cism from refugee agencies, and
church and human rights groups.
I n t e rnational critics, including re g i o n a l
ones, have made the obvious point
t h a t A u s t r a l ia—w i th i t s v a s t l a nd a re a ,
stable society and superior economic
position—is far better equipped to
host refugees than the island micro-
states.
For Pacific Islanders land is a pre-
cious commodity, and in many coun-
tries there is chronic conflict over
landownership and use rights. The
integration of immigrant communities
has also posed a major challenge for
affected nations, contributing to peri-
ods of political instability and insecu-
rity. It is not surprising that most
countries opted not to participate in
the Pacific Solution despite the sub-
stantial aid enticements. Conversely,
one can understand why Nauru and
Papua New Guinea did not pass up
the opportunity for additional income
and donor goodwill, in view of their
parlous economic circumstances. The
Pacific Council of Churches and
regional nongovernment org a n i z a t i o n s
appealed to Pacific governments to
carefully consider the long-term con-
sequences and impacts of accepting
aid deals in connection with refugees.
They believed it could impact
adversely on communal life as well 
as sovereignty (P N B, Oct 2001, 8).
The multimillion dollar funds
expended on the Pacific Solution
would better be directed to sustainable
regional development than wasted 
on long-distance transportation of
refugees, construction and staffing 
of detention centers, and ad hoc aid.
Instead of trying to deter refugees 
by harsh mandatory detention and 
re-exportation to diminutive neigh-
bors, Australia could cooperate with
UN agencies and other nations in
tackling the root causes of mass refu-
gee movements, for example, by pro-
viding much needed aid, human rights
monitoring, and preventive diplomacy
in known trouble spots. A potential
refugee crisis is developing in Melane-
sia, which Australia and the Forum
have done little to address, much less
prevent. The Indonesian province of
West Papua (Irian Jaya) is shaping up
to be another East Timor in more
ways than one (see von Strokirch
2001). 
It is disturbing that the newly
appointed commander of the Indo-
nesian military forces (t n i) in West
Papua, Major-General Simbolon, has
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served no fewer than six tours of duty
in East Timor, including the original
invasion. He played a key role in
counter-insurgency operations, and
until 1999 he was chief of staff at the
Balinese command in overall charge
of East Timor. This was the period
during which Indonesia employed
armed militia to oppose the indepen-
dence campaign and there is already
evidence of such militias forming in
West Papua. Tensions were high after
the December 2000 arrest of Papua
Council Presidium leaders. In January
2001 four members of Indonesia’s
special Kopassus forces were killed in
an exchange with guerrillas from the
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (opm). In
addition, an opm senior commander,
M a t h i a s We n d a , a nd t w e l v e of his m e n
were arrested in PNG territory and
received prison sentences. Human
rights observers are concerned that
Wenda and his deputy could be
deported to Indonesia after serving
their sentences (P N B, Feb 2001, 11).
In the face of increased operations
against them by Indonesia, and to a
lesser extent Papua New Guinea, the
West Papuan independence movement
has strongly lobbied the Pacific Islands
Forum to gain support for its self-
determination. In particular they seek
to have West Papua reinscribed on the
UN list of non–self-governing territo-
ries; the 1969 “Act of Free Choice”
reexamined; a UN mission to inves-
tigate human rights abuses; and
o b s e rvers to monitor the trials of We s t
Papuan leaders. A delegation from the
Papua Council Presidium toured the
region in mid-2001 to explain these
aims and also their quest for official
observer status at the forthcoming
Forum (P N B, June 2001).
Because of considerable sympathy
for the West Papuan cause among
Pacific Island states, West Papua had,
for the first time, been allowed a pres-
ence at the 2000 Forum and were
accorded a reference in the official
communiqué. Unfortunately, internal
divisions within the West Papua inde-
pendence movement led to their rep-
resentatives being banned by Nauru
from attending the 2001 annual meet-
ing. In contrast, Indonesia was for-
mally granted the status of dialogue
partner and attended its first Forum
with an eight-member delegation
including many high-level pro-Jakarta
West Papuans. Indonesia also revealed
plans to open an embassy in Suva.
The final communiqué was a mixed
blessing for the West Papuans. It
expressed concern over continuing
violence in Papua and asked that 
both sides uphold human rights, yet it
explicitly recognized Indonesia as the
sovereign authority and supported the
form of autonomy Indonesia was pre-
paring for the province even though
West Papuans have rejected this status
(P I F 2001; P N B, Aug 2001). The
F o rum announced that it would
“closely follow developments” in
West Papua, but how this was to be
done and what actions would result
were not clear.
Reports suggest that human rights
abuses have been continuing since 
the fall of Suharto, even under the
moderate president, Abdurrahman
Wahid. The West Papuan Institute for 
Human Rights Studies and Advocacy
(ElsHAM) reported that from 1998 to
2000 there were 80 cases of summary
execution and 500 cases of arbitrary
arrest including torture. The ElsHAM
director also alleged that Indonesian
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forces have been infiltrating the o p m
and other elements of the indepen-
dence movement in an effort to cause
disunity and provoke actions that
could justify military repression. In
another divide-and-rule strategy, the
army has fostered sectarian divisions
between Christian and Muslim resi -
dents and between different indige-
nous groups (P N B, Sept 2001, 3).
Papuan religious leaders believe that
“the violence is not incidental, that
there is a systematic and planned
cycle of violence” (P N B, Oct 2001, 3).
According to the Institute for Human
Rights Studies and Advocacy and
Amnesty International, these trends
persisted in 2001 and showed no
signs of abating under the hard-line
nationalist president, Megawati
Sukarnoputri.
The Indonesian parliament did 
pass a special autonomy bill for West
Papua on 2 3 O c t o b e r, giving the pro v-
ince greater power and revenue; how-
ever, the Papuan Presidium Council
dismissed the concession as ignoring
their aspirations for self-determina-
tion. The council also called for a halt
to both tni and o p m military opera-
tions (P N B, Oct 2001, 3). In view of
the Presidium’s efforts to promote
peaceful dialogue, it is ironic that
Indonesia proceeded with trials for
leading council members charged with
subversion. Even more alarming was
the murder in November of Theys
Eluay, chairman of the council. Eluay
was also on trial, but he had been
released pending the judicial outcome.
He was abducted on his way home
from an Indonesian military base and
there are strong suspicions among
local nongovernment organizations
about Kopassus involvement in his
death. The appointment of a joint
police and military team to investigate
his murder was thus decried as a
cover-up (P N B, Nov 2001, 8).
Eluay played a complex role in
West Papuan politics. In the 1980s
and early 1990s he was a provincial
representative for the ruling Golkar
party and had close ties with the local
Indonesian military. After the fall of
Suharto in 1998, he became an active
supporter of independence. He was
still distrusted by many activists, espe-
cially the o p m who had been fighting
a guerrilla war since the 1970s. The
o p m also rejected Eluay’s call for
peaceful dialogue with Jakarta. This
strategic issue combined with person-
ality conflicts contributed to continu-
ing divisions within the movement.
Nevertheless, Eluay was a charismatic
leader who quickly developed a popu-
lar following. This led to his election
as leader of the inaugural Papuan
Presidium Council in 2000 (P N B, Nov
2001, 9). If Indonesian forces were
responsible for Eluay’s death, it is
unclear what advantage they sought
to gain. Not only has one of the lead-
ing advocates for nonviolence been
removed, but an inspirational martyr
for the independence movement has
been created where there was none
before.
karin von stro k i rc h
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